

International Illegal Arms Trade:

- Nigerian Mission to the UN
 - Statement by Nigeria about the arms trade
 - Statements from the ambassador
- Foreign Policy and Atlantic and National Review magazine
- Treaty FLAWS
 - <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>
 - Not detailed
 - Control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms... and parts and components but HOW
 - Encourages countries to make control lists public, but are required to send lists to Secretariat
 - Focus on exporting, not importing
 - Importers are the ones who do a lot of the arms smuggling, not exporters
 - Export registry
 - Brokering
 - labeling/cataloguing
 - Exchange of information
 - Encourages countries to share info and cooperate so they don't necessarily have to
 - Management of reserve excess stockpiles
 - Transparency
- Look at old resolutions... from people
- Small Arms trade
 - Mitigate effects of it in its current state
 - Weaken the infrastructure the issue
 - Benefits for people supporting this
 - Incentives for supporting this
 - How to stop the economic incentives of trafficking arms
 - Gun buy-back programs
 - Australia did this
 - They tried it in New York
 - Make it so difficult to obtain the economic incentive that they stop trying
 - Traffickers fear that they will get caught
 - You force the people bankrolling this to put up such high prices that it bankrupts them
 - Get the mass media to say something
 - Never call it a propaganda campaign
 - SECONDS R IMPORTANT
 - Group chat
 - Second adds back in

- Me “hi guys, just wondering why this happened?”
- Him: “Hi guys, thought it was weird u made a group chat w everyone but that person”
- Possible Hedgehog clauses:
 - Various types of gun violence
 - Gender and Armed Violence:
 - Across cultures, most acts of violence are committed by men, and men and boys also account for the majority of firearm-related deaths and injuries
 - In Rio de Janeiro, young men are 24 times more likely than women to be killed by armed violence, while men between the ages of 15 and 29 are twice as likely to die from armed violence as the rest of the male population.
 - Women and girls are targeted by a number of forms of gender-based violence in different ways:
 - Rape;
 - domestic violence or intimate partner violence;
 - Murder;
 - sexual abuse.
 - Gangs:
 - While gangs control less than two per cent of the world’s small arms, they often find access to military-style automatic firearms and other sophisticated types of weaponry. Gangs are key protagonists in non-conflict-related armed violence

SMALL ARMS SURVEY -look at:

<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/security-programmes/avpr.html>

- *Might want to take toolkits straight from small arms survey to incorporate into larger clauses - glance over, look at when you’re writing*
 - Transparency barometer report for 2016:
 - http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Weapons_and_Markets/Tools/Transparency_barometer/SAS-Transparency-Barometer-2016.pdf
- Direct conflict deaths:
 - Direct conflict deaths are highly concentrated, with the top ten deadliest conflicts accounting for more than three-quarters of the global burden of violent mortality in war.
 - Carefully targeted armed violence reduction in a few selected countries could lead to measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence
 - A few select countries are responsible for these deaths
 - In 2010–15, an average of 535,000 people died violently every year. This global estimate is higher than the ones for the periods 2004–09 and 2007–12.

- A growing number of people are dying in conflict: while an annual average of 70,000 deaths were recorded in 2007–12, the figure rose to 90,000 in 2010–15. The armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are responsible for a large proportion of these deaths.
- The global homicide rate is continuing its decrease, but not enough to offset the increase in conflict deaths in 2010–15.
- The vast majority (83 per cent) of victims of fatal armed violence lose their lives outside of conflict zones. Direct conflict deaths account for the remaining 17 per cent.
- The global distribution of violence is becoming increasingly unequal: fewer countries are registering high violent death rates (above 20 per 100,000 population), but their average violent death rates are on the rise.
- In absolute numbers, more lives were lost to violence in 2015 in large countries that were not experiencing conflict, such as Brazil and India, than in war-torn Syria.
- Indirect conflicts deaths:
 - Although male and female combatants are the most obvious casualties, armed conflicts also contribute to excess mortality and morbidity in the civilian population—largely through the spread of infectious disease, destruction of assets, the loss of entitlements, and the diversion of scarce resources away from basic services
 - A reasonable estimate would be an average ratio of four indirect deaths to one direct death in contemporary conflicts.
 - That would represent at least 200,000 indirect conflict deaths per year, and possibly many more.
 - Indirect victims of armed conflict die from a variety of specific causes:
 - easily preventable diseases such as dysentery or measles.
 - hunger and malnutrition.
 - These deaths are a result of the loss of access to basic health care, adequate food and shelter, clean water, or other necessities of life. In the long run, armed conflict affects mortality by its destructive impact:
 - on the national economy and infrastructure (including health facilities).
 - on social cohesion.
 - on psychological health and well-being.
- Non-conflict deaths
 - Homicide:
 - In an intentional homicide, the perpetrator purposefully aims to cause the death of a victim:
 - Interpersonal violence.
 - domestic disputes that end in a killing.
 - violent conflicts over land, resources, grazing, or water rights.
 - inter-gang clashes over turf or control.
 - predatory violence and killing by armed groups.

- Suicide:
 - The World Health Organization defines suicide as the act of deliberately killing oneself
 - A gun in the home is significantly associated with a higher risk of firearm suicide.
 - Teenagers are seen as more likely to act impulsively; consequently, they are considered more at risk of committing suicide if they can access a firearm.
- Extrajudicial Killings:
 - broadly defined as the illegitimate use of fatal armed violence by agents of the state against its citizens. They may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of force by the police, security forces, or other state actors against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or other individuals or groups, and can also include murders committed by private groups, if instigated by the government. *I have a better definition.*
 - In 2006, at least 12 countries unaffected by war recorded more than 50 extrajudicial killings, with most not being captured in typical surveillance systems.
 - In 2006, a high proportion of armed violence by agents of the state was concentrated in just over 30 countries.
- Non-conflict Non-lethal violence
 - Disappearances
 - Abductions
 - Family does not know if victim is alive
 - Often political
 - Kidnappings
 - frequently undertaken by armed groups or individuals and involves a high degree of coercive force
 - A lot of psychological fall-out
 - An annual global average of 1,350 cases of kidnapping for ransom were reported from 1998 to 2002. These appear to have increased to 1,425 in 2007.
 - The five countries registering the most kidnapping cases in 2007 were Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Venezuela.
- Economic Impact of armed violence:
 - The annual global economic costs of armed violence run into the hundreds of billions of dollars
 - Violent civil conflict decreases the GDP growth of an average economy by at least two per cent per year
 - Contingent valuation approaches yield a global cost of 'insecurity' generated by conflict of up to USD 70 per person, or a global annual burden of USD 400 billion.

- post-shipment controls designed to assess compliance with export license conditions.
 - transparent licensing criteria reflecting the state's international obligations and commitments
 - the sharing of licensing decisions across government agencies,
 - cooperation among the countries of export, import, and transit,
 - effective national mechanisms for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of transfer control violations.
- Brokers
 - 'a person or entity acting as an intermediary that brings together relevant parties and arranges or facilitates a potential transaction of small arms and light weapons in return for some form of benefit, whether financial or otherwise' (UN doc. A/62/163, para. 8).
 - Illegal brokers:
 - rely on a general lack of governmental control and screening over their activities
- Weapons Collection and Destruction
 - the efficacy of different incentives for the voluntary surrender of weapons.
 - And destroy it securely!
- Marking, Record-keeping, and Tracing
 - The International Tracing Instrument, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2005, defines small arms tracing as 'the systematic tracking of illicit small arms and light weapons found or seized on the territory of a State from the point of manufacture or the point of importation through the lines of supply to the point at which they became illicit'.
 - The first step in any tracing operation is to uniquely identify the weapon on the basis of its physical characteristics and markings. Then, with the cooperation of the states that previously manufactured and imported the weapon, changes in ownership are tracked using available documentary records. The ultimate, but often elusive, goal of tracing is to identify the point in the transfer chain at which the (typically) legal weapon entered the illicit market. The three pillars of marking, record-keeping, and cooperation are essential to successful tracing
 - The International Tracing Instrument commits all UN member states to specific marking and record-keeping standards and establishes common rules for tracing cooperation. It does not apply to ammunition, however. Ammunition tracing still relies on an incomplete system of stamping and a patchwork of national regulations.
- *Definitions could come from here*
- Security Programs
 - Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (of former fighters)
 - Security Sector Reform (SSR)

- In 2001, it was formalized into international law under the Programme of Action (PoA)
- A “small” or “light” weapon is portable
- Small weapons include different types of guns - rifles, pistols - and light weapons are a step-up - machine guns, grenade launchers
- For the purposes of the committee, naming these explicitly should not be the aim.
- **A proper definition, either based on past UN resolutions or on original ideas, is requested for every working paper. The aim, in the end, is to be able to distinguish between SALW’s and conventional weapons of war.**
- At least 41% of homicides committed worldwide are executed with small arms
- there are over 875 million SALWs in the world
- ATT Problems:
 - lacks specificity
 - Large craters - danger to countries already in trouble
 - Small countries believe that regulations allow big countries to have more weapons while small countries have zilch
 - Weakened in:
 - Export registry
 - Brokering
 - labeling/cataloguing
 - Exchange of information
 - Management of reserve excess stockpiles
 - Transparency
- “...perhaps most significantly the PoA provided for a regular follow-up process, including periodic review conferences as well as biennial meetings of participating states”
- Document strictly focusing on SALW is needed
- Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has stated that “guns can be licensed, marked or confiscated; ammunition can be tracked, removed or destroyed; and depots can be guarded, cleared or secured”
- *convincing players from opposite sides of the aisles to compromise*
- The document should also address concerns over the differences between legitimate and illicit trade of arms - protect the development and sale of legal weapons for big powers

Toward Internationally Regulated Goods: Controlling the Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons -

<http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=facpub>

- Consider small arms and light weapons. Small arms, such as rifles and pistols, are weapons for individual use. Light weapons such as heavy machine guns, are designed for the use of a small crew. According to estimates, the death toll of small arms far exceeds that of any other weapon, including weapons of mass destruction. Worldwide, small arms cause at least 200,000 deaths annually in homicides, suicides, and unintentional shootings in non-conflict situations

- Indirect conflict deaths will be a thing here
- Economic costs:
 - Medical treatment
 - Refugee flows
 - Destruction of physical infrastructure
 - Losses in productivity and foreign investment
 - Political instability
 - Trade obstruction
 - Disruption of health care and education
- Small Arms widely used for terrorism, organized crime, gang warfare
- PoA weaknesses:
 - Monitoring and verification arrangements aren't there
 - It's a political declaration, not a treaty
 - Fails to ban arms supply to unauthorized non state actors
 - Doesn't address amo
- One innovation is the replacement of protection with negative externalities as the main impetus for trade restrictions and control. Governments favor international regulation, first and foremost, to curb primary externalities—the trade's negative effects on their own countries.
- A second innovation is moral concerns about secondary externalities—the trade's negative effects on foreign countries—contrary to the focus of conventional trade models on material incentives
- The third innovation is the government's role: not only a policy maker, but possibly a market actor— exporter or consumer
- Past trade regulations:
 - For example, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires states “to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs
 - The 1970 UNESCO Convention lays out rules concerning the import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property, aiming specifically at antiquities
 - The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme establishes a system of standardized certificates that accompany international shipments of rough diamonds
- Measures to lower demand may include:
 - court and police reform to enhance security,
 - community policing,
 - provision of education and employment,
 - stigmatization of guns and gun violence
- The influences on the government are thus threefold: wishes of interest groups, wishes of the public, and policymakers' values
- Regulation could also ban certain transactions, could slow or limit export through administrative requirements, and could increase the costs of production and transfer of the goods. For instance, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires any export of

drugs to receive a separate export authorization; this authorization will be given only upon receipt of an import certificate issued by the authorities of the importing country

- The cons is that its bad for those exporting and bad for consumers → raised prices
- For example, when country A exports pirated goods to country B, the results are lost revenue to the legitimate author in country C and the inhibition of future innovation
- Why Governments may care about trade's negative effects:
 - First, uncontrolled trade could threaten and undermine social welfare. Policymakers concerned about political survival may therefore perceive a connection between addressing the externalities of trade and public support
 - Second, policymakers may be genuinely concerned about public welfare and act to curb the externalities out of a sense of duty and responsibility
 - Third, interest groups negatively affected by the trade may lobby governments to take action
 - Finally, uncontrolled trade may sometimes harm governments themselves. For example, supplying guns to rebel groups or financing these groups through sale of diamonds directly threatens governments' survival in power

Influence of primary/secondary negative externalities

		Low	High
Exporter/ consumer influence	Low	I. Weakly affected governments (Moderate regulation)	II. Pro-regulation governments
	High	III. Anti-regulation governments	IV. Cross-pressured governments (Support for regulation varies)

FIGURE 1. *Expected government preferences on international regulation*

- As explained above, governments that cannot control the trade and reduce its negative effects by themselves seek international regulation in order to establish controls at the other end of the chain. International regulation allows those governments to make up for their regulatory weakness
- The problem that emerges from this large heterogeneity of preferences is lack of shared interest in cooperation. Certain governments stand to benefit from international regulation; for other governments, however, international regulation is highly undesirable, as it yields large costs and only small gains, if any.

- One mechanism that allows powerful governments to overcome the absence of shared interest is issue linkage, by which “multiple issues are included in the final settlement in an effort to create a balance where both sides gain enough to accept the costs”
- A second mechanism that powerful governments may employ is coercion. Through rewards and punishments, powerful governments can increase the benefits of cooperation or the costs of noncooperation and thereby induce weaker governments to accept more robust regulation than they would have preferred
- More than 1,200 companies in more than ninety countries are involved in some aspect of small-arms production. Of those, thirty to thirty-five countries export small arms with annual sales of more than \$10 million. The documented value of all small-arms exports in 2003 ~based on reports to UN Comtrade! was about \$2 billion. According to estimates, the total annual value of the trade in small arms reaches \$4 billion
- Yet “arms sales are far more than an economic occurrence...arms sales are foreign policy writ large.”(40) *good quote*
- Consumers:
 - Armed groups—such as rebels, criminals, and terrorists—have an obvious interest in opposing regulation
 - However, these are precisely the consumers that governments would like to prevent from obtaining arms
 - Civilian gun owners are thus likely to oppose international regulation of small arms
- I argue that nondemocratic governments in particular are less likely to favor international small-arms regulation because of the centrality of domestic repression for their social control and political survival
 - Nondemocratic governments are less likely to support international regulation of small arms compared with democracies.
- High homicide rates or large refugee outflows increase governments’ support for international regulation of small arms.
- The theoretical framework has suggested that governments’ support for international regulation should increase with the magnitude of the externalities that their countries bear
- Governments’ support for international regulation also depends on their capacity to control small arms, and the two should be negatively correlated
- Secondary externalities are the externalities borne by foreign countries. For small arms, the source of concern about secondary externalities is the devastating humanitarian effects of gun proliferation and misuse, from fatalities to refugee flows to stifled development




FIGURE 2. *Government preferences on international regulation of small arms*

Influence of primary/secondary negative externalities

		Low	High
Exporter/ consumer influence	Low	I. Weakly affected <i>Indonesia (3), Peru (3), Botswana (3)</i>	II. Pro-regulation <i>Colombia (5), Somalia (5), Japan (5), Sweden (4)</i>
	High	III. Anti-regulation <i>China (0), Egypt (1), Syria (1), Belarus (0)</i>	IV. Cross-pressured <i>Austria (5), India (2), Cuba (2), United States (1)</i>

Note: The country's REGULATION score is in parentheses.

FIGURE 3. *Variation in government preferences on international regulation of small arms*

- Quad II: In particular, these countries are in favor of regulating the legal small-arms trade. They believe that the legal and the illicit trade are two sides of the same coin since most illicit weapons begin their lives as legal weapons. Therefore, these countries reject attempts to distinguish between the legal and the illicit trade and argue that a focus on

the illicit trade alone would undermine the UN process. Respondents also expressed disappointment over the political nature of the Program of Action, arguing that a legally binding instrument would have been more effective.

- Similar to countries bearing primary externalities, humanitarian-motivated countries tend to prefer comprehensive regulation that would address the legal as well as the illicit trade in small arms. They support legally binding commitments, a stronger compliance mechanism than the existing one, and various regulatory measures, including transparency and international transfer-controls.
- The U.S. government is also cross-pressured. Controlling small arms could reduce the risk to American soldiers overseas and is consistent with the humanitarian aspect of U+S+ foreign policy. Yet international regulation could potentially harm American gun manufacturers and could restrict the United States' ability to provide arms to non state actors. Most importantly, small-arms consumers—civilian gun owners represented by the NRA—perceive international regulation as a threat
- Countries favoring weak international regulation, especially major arms-exporting countries such as China, were willing to accept the non-legally binding PoA; however, they have declined to ratify the legally binding Firearms Protocol. In fact, ratification of the Protocol follows the cross-regional preference variation depicted in Figure 2
- The cooperative outcome therefore conforms to the preference for weak regulation of countries such as the United States, China, Egypt, and Iran. The governments of these countries sought an agreement that would reflect concern about the grave problem of small arms, but would lack teeth. The PoA was indeed that
- In the case of the PoA, the problem is absence of shared interest in cooperation


<http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11889.doc.htm>

- Some good *public* positions on country policy
- Nigeria - one of the first countries to accede ATT
 - Much violence in Nigeria from terrorist groups that get SALWs illegally
 - Wants a regional approach (Economic Community of West African States)
 - Supports global measures
- Mr. Ban:
 - “Guns can be licensed, marked or confiscated; ammunition can be tracked, removed or destroyed; and depots can be guarded, cleared or secured”
- Al Hussein:
 - “These are the weapons of the easy kill: the most portable, most easily accessible, most casual instruments of death — even a small child can, with its tiny muscles, vanquish a life. In war, however appallingly, it is often the child that receives the bullet.”
- The representative of the Russian Federation said that the proposed resolution had ignored a variety of his country's suggestions. It also contained language that infringed on the sovereignty of States by calling for United Nations missions to have arms control responsibilities, while, he stressed, the main obligation for controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons fell on States. - *really, RUSSIA said that? Who would*

have guessed that the second biggest empire in the world would be worried about national sovereignty?

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/GSH2013/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf

Fig. 3.1: Homicide mechanism, by region (2012 or latest year)



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and IHME (2012).

- When grouping the countries into low, medium and high levels of household gun ownership, results indicate that countries with higher levels of firearm ownership also have higher firearm homicide rates
- CFR's ideas:
 - <http://www.cfr.org/arms-industries-and-trade/strategy-reduce-gun-trafficking-violence-americas/p31155>
 - *Expand nationwide the state-level multiple-sale reporting requirement for assault weapons*
 - *Incorporate strategies to reduce existing stocks of illegal firearms into U.S.-Brazil dialogue on defense and security*
 - *Exclude firearms and ammunition products from the Export Control Reform Initiative*

- Apply the "sporting test" standards of the 1968 Gun Control Act. This provision prohibits the import of weapons not "suitable or readily adaptable for sporting purposes," including but not limited to military-style firearms.
- Continue to support federal, state, and local initiatives to improve regulation of the U.S. civilian firearms market. - bans the sale of assault rifles and high-capacity magazines, broadens existing background check requirements for firearm purchases, and modernizes gun-owner registries by requiring, among others, that buyers submit their fingerprints when applying for a gun license

Arms Control - <https://www.armscontrol.org/print/391>

- Advantages of Light Weapons:
 - Low Cost and Wide Availability
 - Lethality
 - weapons capable of firing up to 300 rounds a minute
 - Simplicity and Durability
 - Portability and Concealability
 - Military, Police and Civilian Uses
- The following list of legal, illegal and covert methods by which small arms and light weapons are sold, transferred and exchanged underscores the complexity of the problem:
 - Grants or gifts by governments to allied governments abroad;
 - Sales by governments to client governments abroad;
 - Commercial sales by private firms to governments and private dealers in other countries;
 - Technology transfers associated with domestic arms production in the developing nations;
 - Covert transfers by governments to friendly insurgent and separatist groups in other countries;
 - Gifts by governments to armed militias and paramilitary organizations linked to the ruling party or the dominant ethnic group;
 - Black-market sales to the governments of "pariah" countries and to insurgent and separatist forces;
 - Theft of government and privately owned arms by insurgent, criminal and separatist forces; and
 - Exchanges between insurgent and criminal organizations, whether for profit or in pursuit of common political objectives.
 - Straw purchasers are people with no criminal background purchase guns for others who cannot
- Legal Channels
 - there are over 300 manufacturers of light weapons and related equipment in 50 countries around the world, a 25 percent increase in the last decade alone
 - Accordingly, countries such as the United States, Russia and Germany (especially with the dismantling of the East German army) have been able to sell or transfer millions of light weapons to their allies and clients abroad

- Covert and 'Gray-Market' Channels
 - small arms and light weapons are disseminated through covert and "gray-market" channels (that is, channels that operate with government support even though in violation of official government policy), most often by government intelligence agencies or private companies linked to such agencies
- Illicit and Black-Market Channels
 - illegal sales through black-market channels, the supply of arms in defiance of international embargoes and other legal sanctions, and the theft of arms from government stocks or private citizens. In recent years, there has been a striking growth in the operations of black-market dealers to satisfy the needs of non-state actors in ethnic and internal conflicts
- Possible Solutions:
 - Establish International Norms against the uncontrolled and destabilizing transfer of small arms and light weapons to areas of tension and conflict
 - It must become axiomatic, moreover, that the right to acquire arms for self-defense entails an obligation to maintain such weapons under effective government control at all times and to preclude their diversion to illicit purposes
 - International norms could also be developed along the lines of the Geneva Conventions, where states-parties would be prohibited from supplying light weapons to any government, group or entity that does not have the resources to treat its wounded or those of the enemy, or has not trained its own personnel in the laws of war.
 - Increase International Transparency
 - lack of detailed information on the production, sale and transfer of such munitions
 - At the international level
 - emphasis should be placed on the adoption of measures needed to strengthen the implementation of weapons embargoes agreed to by the United Nations and associated bodies.
 - While such embargoes may never be entirely leakproof, evidence has shown that even a modest number of international observers at airfields, seaports and other points of entry for weapons to an area of conflict can make a difference.
 - When supplemented by stricter national export controls, embargoes can make it far more difficult to deliver significant quantities of modern weapons to areas of conflict.
 - Reducing Surplus Weapons
 - many states—particularly former Eastern bloc countries—are eager to sell arms for hard currency with few or no questions asked
 - States that can afford to do so should agree to destroy the surplus arms and ammunition in their possession and to take all the necessary steps to prevent the leakage of weaponry from government depots and warehouse

- For their parts, the United States and Russia should agree to cooperate in locating and reclaiming (or buying back) weapons given by them to insurgent groups during the Cold War
- Post-Conflict Measures.
 - A high priority should be placed on efforts to remove the large quantities of small arms and light weapons that often remain in-country once a particular conflict has ended
 - in many countries around the world the possession of arms is deeply embedded in society - the primary emphasis should be on economic development and social reconstruction so that ex-combatants and non-combatants have viable options in the civilian economy
 - Recent initiatives on the part of the World Bank and a number of development and humanitarian NGOs to better integrate economic assistance programs with demobilization, destruction of weapons and conflict prevention strategies are a useful step in this direction
- International Capacity-Building
 - It is therefore essential that the stronger participants in the system assist the weaker elements to establish effective and reliable mechanisms for the oversight of the arms market
 - As part of such efforts, technology should be developed and deployed internationally to help track the flow of small arms and light weapons, identify illicit sources of supply, and improve law enforcement and customs prosecution of illegal suppliers and traders. In addition to developing computer databases and communications systems that can facilitate international cooperation on the light weapons trade, several other technical initiatives have been proposed for helping to increase the transparency of light weapons flows

NIGERIA:

- The security of the Nigerian state is aimed at protecting the national integrity of the state and defending the essential values that constitute Nigerian identity. Nigeria is rated high in the regional debate for the control of small arms and light weapons and illegal trade. For more than a decade, diplomatic activity to contain arms and ammunition transfers has been animated by a concern with instability and crises generated in the continent many years back. Leading think tanks, research groups, and advocacy organizations have repeatedly drawn attention to the way the burden of armed violence in Northern Nigeria is a product of high porous borders and low-tech assault by the Nigerian government.
- Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa - played large role in this (1998)

Table 3.2: Nigeria's Participation in Measures to Address SALW, 1997-2006

Years	Instrument
1997	Convention on the Proliferation of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (entered into force in 1999).
1998	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons (ECOWAS Moratorium) reviewed in 2001 and 2004)
2000	Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons.
2000	United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (entered into force in 2003).
2001	United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (Programme of Action).
2001	Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (entered into force in 2005).
2005	International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.
2006	ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (ECOWAS Convention, yet enter into force as of 2006)

Source: Culled from Hazen and Horner (2007).

- <http://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/jesr/article/download/1859/1858>
- **Humanitarian Outreach - H, O, W(human welfare)**
- Anti-Economic Incentives - M, A
- **Stockpile reduction - S, R(reserve), H(hoard), C(cache), N(number)**
- **Trade Regulations - T, R - International Norms - I, G(Global)**
- Manufacturing Controls - M, C
- **Ammunition Tracing - A, T, R(rounds), C(cartridges), S (shells),**
- **Media Appeal - M, A, N(news) R(request)**
- **Strengthen the ATT - S,**
- Definitions - D
- ECOWAS:
- <http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/ECOWAS/ECOWAS%20Convention%202006.pdf>
-