



JUNIOR ACADEMY MODEL UN XII

SOCHUM

TOPIC GUIDE

Audrey Won
Elli Yao

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JUNIOR ACADEMY MODEL UNITED NATIONS

- Twelveth Annual Conference -

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to JAMUN XII! My name is Audrey Won, and I am honored to serve as a co-chair for the SOCHUM committee. Right now, I'm a sophomore in the Academy of Business and Finance (ABF), and besides MUN, I'm involved in multiple clubs here at BCA, including DECA and HOSA! I love animals and music, and I like to bake as well. I started getting involved in Model UN this year, and I was immediately captivated by the community it fosters and the opportunities to connect with people from all over Bergen County and beyond. I'm so excited for this conference, and I hope you are too!

SOCHUM (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee) was created to debate prevalent human rights and social development issues worldwide. As we discuss these possibly sensitive but necessary topics, my co-chair and I expect utmost respect and maturity. These issues may be difficult to address initially, but we believe that discussing them is vital to social progress. With respectful and thoughtful discussion, you can be the social progress that you hope to see in the future.

MUN is a great way to improve your public speaking skills, make new friends, and engage in thought-provoking discussions. I hope you will take this opportunity not only to excel in committee but also to socialize and connect with your fellow committee members. Just be kind and inclusive, and SOCHUM will be a great experience for everyone.

If you ever have any questions or concerns, please feel free to reach out. Good luck with your preparation, and see you in committee!

Best Regards,
Audrey Won
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Hello Delegates,

Welcome to JAMUN XII's SOCHUM! My name is Elli Yao, and I am so excited to be your SOCHUM co-chair this year. A little bit about myself is that I'm currently a sophomore in the Academy of Business and Finance (ABF). I'm a competitive equestrian, I love listening to music, reading, and meeting new people. Outside of MUN, I'm on BCA's golf team and also do DECA. I got into Model UN earlier this year, being a delegate for SOCHUM, and have been having fun in MUN ever since.

As your co-chairs, we look forward to meaningful discussions on social, humanitarian, and cultural issues affecting our world today. Although these topics may be challenging, engaging in these discussions is important for bringing forth change regarding these issues. Model UN is a great opportunity to improve your public speaking, develop leadership skills, and interact with other like-minded individuals. Even though MUN can get competitive, we stress the importance of delegates being able to work together and encourage each other to come to collaborative solutions.

In this committee, I hope to create an environment where you all can express your ideas and find creative solutions to current problems. Remember, the most important part of Model UN isn't to be the loudest or most competitive in the room, but rather to have fun and learn from your experience!

For any questions you may have, feel free to reach out to either my co-chair or me.

Best of Luck,
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TOPIC:
Addressing the
rights of
displaced child
refugees in the
Sudanese Civil
War



INTRODUCTION

April 15, 2023 marked the start of the Sudanese Civil War, but for millions of children, it marked the start of losing homes, safety, and basic rights. To date, over 12 million people have been displaced, with nearly half being children, all of whom face threats of violence, exploitation, and a lack of education, healthcare, and many other basic human rights, every single day [1].

The Sudanese Civil War centers around the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), two rival military factions based in Sudan [2]. As this conflict continues to get worse, infrastructure is getting weaker and collapsing, humanitarian systems are getting increasingly overwhelmed, and aid and relief are getting more and more restricted. One of the most pressing issues, however, is the lives of the thousands of kids who get displaced every single day. These displaced children are the most vulnerable, as they are usually separated from their families, exposed to child labor, trafficked, and sometimes forced to work in armed groups. Additionally, in overcrowded refugee camps or informal places of stay, the unsafe conditions and limited resources further worsen their physical and mental well-being.

Despite existing frameworks such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the enforcement of such frameworks remains inconsistent, especially in active conflict zones like Sudan [3]. In this committee, delegates must work collaboratively to strengthen humanitarian reach, enforce child protection frameworks, and develop both short-term and long-term solutions that ensure that displaced children are protected and given the opportunities to rebuild their future.

Topic History.

Sudan has long endured cycles of internal conflict, political instability, and humanitarian catastrophe. The Darfur conflict, beginning in 2003, resulted in an estimated 300,000 deaths and the displacement of over two million people, establishing a grim precedent for mass atrocities in the region [4]. The atrocities and deaths in this conflict are mainly attributed to Omar al-Bashir, who was the reigning dictator in Sudan from 1989 to 2019. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for the former dictator for numerous human rights violations. The institution has stated that there is reasonable evidence to conclude that Bashir pursued the extermination of ethnic groups in Darfur, ordering the mass execution of civilians in the region. Aside from genocide, Bashir has also been suspected for the use of chemical weapons in Darfur, with evidence of these actions being revealed by investigations conducted by international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International [5]. al-Bashir's reign, which was characterized by violence and terror, laid the foundations for what would become one of the largest humanitarian catastrophes in modern history.




Long-time dictator of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir [42].

Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in 2019, when a joint coup by Sudanese military forces took place in the unstable nation. Originally, the RSF was hired by Bashir to protect him from assassination attempts and coups. However, in the 2019 revolution, the RSF joined the SAF to establish a new constitution and transitional government [16]. Before being hired by Bashir, the RSF was originally a rebel-fighting force that received supplies and free rein from the Sudanese government along the Chad-Sudan border. In 2003, several victories against the rebels led Sudan's military intelligence to gather the Arab and Arabic-speaking Janjaweed into a centralized unit. The Janjaweed, while effective, used brutal methods to demoralize enemies. In 2013, al-Bashir solidified the roles of some of the Janjaweed into the RSF. The RSF was originally placed under the National Intelligence and Security Services' authority but was later relocated to be a part of the SAF and therefore, under presidential command [2].

Topic History (continued)

The origin of the SAF can be traced back to 1922, when Sudan was under Egyptian governance; Egypt had just been granted independence by the UK and wanted greater oversight in Sudan. Their solution was to create units of Sudanese auxiliaries to be put into the Egyptian army. These units were called the al-Awitrah and were the source of the SAF [17].

Officially, the nation's military is the SAF, with an estimated number of 200,000 as of 2023. The RSF, on the other hand, serves as a paramilitary and is technically a semi-autonomous organization. Since the two groups were instrumental in the overthrow of the previous government, half of the country is under RSF governance, while the other half is under SAF governance[18]. After the coup overthrowing al-Bashir, a conjoined SAF-RSF government was attempted but quickly overthrown.



A destroyed building in Khartoum [43].

The civil war formally began on April 15, 2023, when escalating tensions between the two military forces escalated into war. These disputes and tensions can be attributed to the integration of the RSF into Sudan's national armed forces. Both generals from each force sought to preserve as much power as possible, which led to conflict. Resistance committees rejected both factions and instead called for an end to these conflicts and a power transition to a democratic government. These resistance organizations, alongside other organizations, provided food, water, medical care, and other resources for the displaced civilians as best they could.

On April 24–25, 2023, the US and Saudi Arabia arranged a 72-hour ceasefire, which was the first major attempt to stop the fighting. However, this ceasefire was immediately violated, and ensuing truces failed. In May, the US and Saudi Arabia facilitated communication between the RSF and the SAF, which the SAF later refused to participate in, citing the RSF's failure to honor its commitments. On June 1, 2023, the US announced sanctions on RSF and SAF-linked entities. A few days later, another ceasefire was announced, and fighting was halted for 24 hours before resuming again. By late June, yet another truce was declared and subsequently violated. In August of 2024, the US convened talks in Geneva, Switzerland, which focused on helping the suffering of civilians affected by the conflicts, while methods to extend and maintain ceasefires were also discussed. In these discussions,

Topic History. (continued)

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE served as mediators between the two factions. The RSF sent a delegation to attend, whereas the SAF declined. On January 7, 2025, the US announced another round of sanctions, this time only against the RSF after determining the RSF's actions as genocide. A couple of weeks later, the Biden administration sanctioned the SAF leader for attacks on civilians. In September 2025, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the US proposed a roadmap to end the war, which also called for a three-month truce and a permanent ceasefire. This proposal was rejected by the SAF, citing that negotiations couldn't proceed unless the UN recognized the SAF's governmental legitimacy. The RSF also rejected this proposal because it was unwilling to participate in a ceasefire. At the time, the RSF believed itself to be close to victory [19]. Unfortunately, the Sudanese Civil War is far from resolving, with conflict still raging across Sudan.

Current Situation

The humanitarian toll on children has been catastrophic in scale. By late 2023, the United Nations declared Sudan home to the world's largest child displacement crisis, with nearly five million children forcibly displaced, representing roughly 53 percent of all internally displaced people in the country [6]. In neighboring

Chad alone, children account for 61 percent of approximately 860,000 Sudanese refugees who have crossed the border since April 2023, with nine in ten arrivals being women or children, and one in five young children suffering from acute malnutrition [7]. Meanwhile, more than 90 percent of Sudan's estimated 19 million school-age children have lost access to formal education, as school buildings were converted into displacement shelters and education infrastructure was destroyed [8]. Around 7.4 million children lack access to safe drinking water, two million have gone without essential vaccines, and an estimated 700,000 children require treatment for severe acute malnutrition [9].



[44]

Children in Sudan face grave and systematic violations of their fundamental rights at the hands of both parties. In just the first several months of conflict, over 3,130 allegations of severe child rights violations were reported (a 550 percent spike from all of 2022), with the Darfur region accounting for at least half of all these cases [10]. Both the SAF and the RSF have been documented recruiting children into armed forces, at times

Current Situation (continued)

through harassment and forcible means [11]. Sexual violence has been weaponized against girls and women, with UN human rights experts documenting reports of girls being trafficked and sold into slavery in RSF-controlled areas of North Darfur, as well as forced and child marriage [12]. In March 2024, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child warned that 24 million children were at risk of a generational catastrophe, with their rights to life, survival, education, health, and development all gravely violated, and noted that some of these violations could constitute war crimes under international law [13].

The international legal framework relevant to this crisis is well-established. Sudan is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which guarantees its children protection from armed conflict, exploitation, and violence, and its Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict prohibits the military recruitment of anyone under 18. The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol establish non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum, which are principles being tested across the region, with reports of host countries such as Egypt forcibly expelling Sudanese asylum seekers without due process [14]. In October 2023, the UN Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-

Finding Mission for Sudan, which gathered testimony from 182 survivors and documented extensive crimes, including ethnic killings and the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure [15]. By December 2023, the U.S. Secretary of State determined that both the SAF and RSF had committed war crimes, with the RSF additionally found responsible for crimes against humanity and genocide [11]. In August 2024, famine was formally declared in the Zamzam IDP camp in North Darfur, which hosted an estimated 400,000 displaced people, making a dire escalation of the food security crisis [14].

Despite these findings, accountability and humanitarian response have fallen far short of what is needed. UNICEF's 2025 humanitarian response plan for Chad was only 34 percent funded, and the broader refugee response plan for the region was less than 5 percent funded as of mid-2025 due to major donor cuts, forcing organizations to scale back essential services [7][8]. Sudan has topped the International Rescue Committee's Emergency Watchlist for three consecutive years [9]. Delegates to SOCHUM must therefore reckon with how international legal frameworks can be made more enforceable, how the specific vulnerabilities of unaccompanied and separated children can be addressed in active conflict environments, how sustainable and burden-sharing among host nations can be achieved, and how accountability for child rights violations committed by both armed parties can be meaningfully pursued. The crisis in Sudan is not only the world's largest

Current Situation

(continued)

displacement emergency; it is a defining test of the international community's commitment to children's rights in armed conflict.

Country Policies

Egypt

Egypt is the single largest host country for Sudanese refugees, but its policies have grown increasingly hostile in practice. By December 2025, over 1 million refugees and asylum seekers were registered with UNHCR in Egypt, including over 834,000 Sudanese, of whom the majority are women and children [20]. In December 2024, Egypt passed its first comprehensive asylum law since 1951. Although the law purports to align with international standards, vague national security provisions, such as the right to exclude or revoke refugee status, and the absence of transitional measures or appeal processes, threaten to further marginalize asylum seekers. The law shifts refugee status determination from UNHCR to a government committee and was adopted without meaningful consultation with UNHCR or NGOs [21]. In practice, deportations have escalated: Amnesty International documented how, since September 2023, Egyptian border and police forces have rounded up and forcibly returned thousands of Sudanese refugees, with an estimated 18,000

individuals deported from Egypt to Sudan in 2024 alone [22]. For child refugees specifically, unaccompanied and separated children face extreme difficulty accessing protection, and the waiting time for an asylum-based residence permit had reached 576 days as of June 2024 [23]. The EU has compounded the problem: despite well-documented abuses, the EU signed a strategic partnership with Egypt in March 2024, partly aimed at deepening cooperation on migration and border control, and provided 80 million euros to build up Egyptian border guard capacity to curb irregular migration [22].

Chad

Chad is the frontline host of Sudanese child refugees and is simultaneously one of the world's poorest. Between April 2023 and February 2025, 754,059 Sudanese and 216,337 Chadian returnees from Sudan were registered in Chad. 60% of refugees and 68% of returnees are children under 18 years of age [24]. Children make up 61 percent of refugee arrivals. Most have entered through Adré and other entry points in the eastern provinces, the areas already among the most deprived in the country. Despite immense efforts by the Chadian government and humanitarian partners, the scale of the crisis is overwhelming [25]. The most acute child-specific crisis is that of unaccompanied minors: UNHCR has identified 42,000 unaccompanied and separated children across Sudan and neighboring countries, with Chad hosting the largest number at 24,000. Child protection operations require \$66 million

Country Policies **(continued)**

in 2026, following a 78% funding gap in 2025 [26]. Education has essentially collapsed: 65 percent of refugee children in Chad lack access to education, heightening risks of child labor, early marriage, trafficking, and recruitment by armed groups [27]. UNICEF requires \$114 million for its 2025 humanitarian response in Chad, but the overall response was only 34 percent funded at the time of reporting [25].

Potential Solutions

1. Delegates can consider establishing child protection mechanisms in refugee camps to keep mistreatment to a minimum.
2. Delegates can consider increasing aid to refugee camps to support hygiene and vaccination efforts and prevent serious future medical problems.
3. Delegates can consider increasing aid provision of necessities, such as food and water, to refugee camps.
4. Delegates can consider establishing educational institutions in camps to help refugees in re-integrating into society in the future.

5. Delegates can consider implementing psychological child support programs to help children deal with the trauma associated with being displaced and in a war zone.
6. Delegates can consider ways to help displaced children and other refugees reunite with or find their families.
7. Delegates can consider creating child-only areas with adult supervision where children can socialize with each other.
8. Delegates can encourage the strengthening of law enforcement mechanisms and coordination within refugee camps.

Questions to Consider

1. How can the UN determine which refugee camps are most in need of support?
2. How can international law be used to ensure adequate protection and support of child refugees?
3. With the country still split into two, how can resources be distributed fairly, considering the fact that transportation between the two sides is very limited?
4. What kind of support is currently most needed by the child refugees?
5. What support can be provided to child refugees without familial support?
6. What long-term solutions can there be for refugees who are unable to return to Sudan?

Questions to Consider **(continued)**

7. How can education and healthcare systems be implemented into the camps?

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